As the Iran war intensifies, control over narrow waterways has become as decisive as control over territory. The near-closure of Hormuz has already choked off a significant share of global oil flows, sending shockwaves through energy markets and exposing just how dependent the modern world is on a handful of maritime corridors.
But Hormuz is only half the story. To its west lies the Bab el-Mandeb — a second, equally vital artery linking the Indian Ocean to the Mediterranean via the Suez Canal. Together, these two straits form a continuous supply chain through which much of the world’s oil, gas, and trade must pass.
Disruption in one raises prices; disruption in both threatens systemic breakdown. Already, analysts warn that pressure on Hormuz is pushing more traffic towards alternative routes that still depend on Bab el-Mandeb, effectively concentrating risk rather than dispersing it.
This is the strategic reality shaping the current war. By leveraging Hormuz directly and Bab el-Mandeb indirectly through regional allies, the Houthis, Iran has acquired a form of asymmetric power that extends far beyond the battlefield. As long as the global economy remains tethered to these two narrow passages, Tehran and its partners retain a decisive advantage — one that complicates any attempt, particularly by Donald Trump, to bring the war to a swift or orderly end.
The Strait of Hormuz and Iran’s greatest strategic advantage
Roughly a fifth of the world’s oil consumption — about 17 to 20 million barrels per day — passes through the Strait of Hormuz. Add liquefied natural gas shipments, particularly from Qatar, and the figure becomes even more consequential. There are alternative routes, but none can quickly absorb the same volume. Pipelines across Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates exist, but they are partial workarounds, not replacements.
During the Iran–Iraq War, the so-called “Tanker War” phase turned the Strait into a battlefield. Both sides targeted oil shipments, hoping to choke each other’s revenues. Mines were laid. Tankers were struck. Insurance premiums soared. The United States intervened, reflagging Kuwaiti vessels and escorting them through the waterway.
The lesson was repeated in smaller bursts over the decades. In 2011–12, sanctions on Iran were met with threats to close the Strait. In 2019, a series of tanker attacks and seizures sent oil prices spiking overnight.
Today, that script is playing out again, but with higher stakes. The ongoing confrontation between the United States and Iran has already seen naval posturing, drone surveillance, and periodic seizures. Tehran has not closed the Strait, as that would constitute an act of outright war, but it has enforced control without formal closure. Only a handful of countries, including Bangladesh, are being allowed to pass through.
Iran’s doctrine relies on making the Strait functionally unusable without formally closing it. And “unusable” does not require a total blockade. Even limited harassment can be enough. A handful of damaged tankers, a credible mining threat, or a spike in insurance costs can reduce traffic dramatically. Shipping companies are risk-averse by design; markets are even more so. As a result, war-risk insurance premiums have surged sharply.
For countries like Bangladesh, which are heavily dependent on imported fuel, the consequences would be immediate. Higher shipping costs, volatile prices, and supply uncertainty would ripple through the economy. What happens in Hormuz does not stay in Hormuz.
The gate of tears in the west
If Hormuz is the choke point of energy, Bab el-Mandeb is the choke point of trade.
Often overlooked as an artery of global commerce, Bab el-Mandeb is known as the “Gate of Tears”. This narrow passage at the southern end of the Red Sea has quietly emerged as one of the most consequential pressure points in the conflict. If Hormuz controls whether oil leaves the Gulf, Bab el-Mandeb determines whether it reaches Europe. Together, they form a single logistical chain.
In 2023, roughly 9.3 million barrels per day of crude and petroleum products passed through Bab el-Mandeb — around 12% of global seaborne oil trade. Beyond energy, the corridor connects Asian manufacturing hubs with European markets through the Suez Canal, which itself handles between 12% and 15% of global trade.
Together, these two straits form a continuous supply chain through which much of the world’s oil, gas, and trade must pass. Disruption in one raises prices; disruption in both threatens systemic breakdown.
Those vulnerabilities have already been tested. Beginning in late 2023, Yemen’s Iran-aligned Houthis launched a sustained campaign against commercial shipping in the Red Sea. Using drones, missiles, and even explosive boats, they targeted vessels linked to Western interests, forcing shipping companies to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope.
The results were immediate and measurable: trade through the Suez Canal dropped by more than 40% within two months, while oil flows through Bab el-Mandeb fell by more than half the following year.
The Houthis have already signalled their readiness. Their leadership has stated that the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, and Bab el-Mandeb “will be among the options” to increase pressure on the United States and its allies.
Crucially, geography favours them. The strait narrows to less than 30 kilometres at its tightest point, making it inherently vulnerable to disruption. From positions along Yemen’s coastline, Houthi forces can target passing vessels with relatively low-cost weapons, while maintaining plausible deniability for Tehran. This allows Iran to escalate indirectly — raising the cost of war without triggering a full-scale confrontation.
Implications for global maritime shipping
Beyond energy, the impact of maritime disruption would extend across the broader global economy. More than 80% of world trade moves by sea, and rerouting around Africa adds 4,000 to 6,000 nautical miles to shipping journeys — delaying deliveries by up to 20 days and sharply increasing costs. These disruptions would disproportionately affect developing economies, which rely heavily on affordable maritime transport for both imports and exports.
Since the war began, traffic through the Strait of Hormuz has collapsed by as much as 95–97%, effectively removing a fifth of the world’s oil supply from open markets. The consequences have been immediate: crude prices have surged towards $150–$170 per barrel, tanker availability has tightened, and freight rates have jumped severalfold, in some cases exceeding $300,000 per day.
Higher fuel costs cascade into transport, manufacturing, fertiliser, and food prices, feeding directly into global inflation and slowing growth. The United Nations now expects global trade growth to fall from 4.7% to as low as 1.5–2.5% because of the disruption.
Bab el-Mandeb is the critical connector between Asia and Europe via the Suez Canal. It handles around 4–8 million barrels per day and carries containerised goods, grains, fertilisers, and industrial inputs. When disruption hits here, there is no pipeline alternative and no quick workaround. Ships are forced to reroute around the Cape of Good Hope, adding 8–10 days to transit times and billions in additional fuel and insurance costs.
This is where the strategic calculation becomes more complex for Washington. President Donald Trump may seek to end the Iran war on his own terms, but any attempt to de-escalate in the Gulf could be undermined by continued instability in the Red Sea. The war may end on paper. But as long as Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb remain contested, their economic shockwaves will continue long after the last missile is fired.